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3.1 Introduction 
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"... It appears that the informal structure of transactions in Japan is recei-
ving greater attention as scholars seek to approximate empirical reality more 
closely". 
Murakami and Rohlen (1992)1 
As has become clear from the previous analyses of the Japanese political economy 
and economie system, a significant number of scholars stress the importance of 
informal factors in the public-private sector relationship in Japan. For 
example, Murakami (1987) introduced the informal organization approach, which 
"... provides the most useful explanation of the key feature of the postwar 
Japanese economy . in Upham (1987), it is stated that "... informality is 
preferred by every level of government and in all areas of government-citizen 
contact" [Upham (1987), p.204]. And Haley (1991) puts it very strongly regarding 
the enforcement of government policy: "What distinguishes Japan is the persuasi-
ve resort to informal enforcement in contexts that seem to require formal 
regulations in other industrial states. In Japan informal enforcement is not a 
process of governing, but has become the process of governing. It is used to 
implement nearly all bureaucratie policy, whether or not expressed in statute or 
regulation, at all levels of government and all administrative offices"3. With 
respect to the organization of Japanese bureaucracy, Keehn (1990), p.1021, 
declares that "... the processes of informality and discretion are a good deal 
more than flexible practices that complement and flesh out formal rules and 
procedures. They are organizational strategies crucial to the functions and 
performance of bureaucracy and government in Japan". Finally, according to 
Tanaka (1976), in Japan "... administrative agencies have exerted greater 
influence than in many other countries over various phases of economie activity 
and also over other aspects of social life through informal and extralegal 
channels" . 
Furthermore, in a substantial number of personal interviews, the interviewees 
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emphasized the importance of informality in Japan5. According to a Dutch 
banker, "... informal regulation is in Japan the rule rather than the excep-
tion"6. A Western scholar, who has been living in Japan for a long time, 
commented that "... in Japan, informal control is very strong and has been 
Consolidated in recent years"^. A Japanese legal scholar sübscribed to this 
viewpoint as follows: "Informalities are a very important aspect of Japanese 
society. Many fields of Japanese society are determined by informal mecha-
nisms"**. 
These are just a few random examples from a large number of scholars who 
emphasize from different disciplines and perspectives the importance of informal 
factors in the relationship between public and private sectors in Japan, more 
specifically in the various forms of government-business interaction in the 
economie system. However, as will become clear, these scholars disagree sharply 
in their judgement of the actual relevance of these informal factors for 
economie policies. 
The basic question that first has to be asked is by which criteria informality 
is being determined. According to the literature, the informal part of the 
public-private sector relationship with respect to the Japanese economie system 
has to be distlnguished in two major components: administrative guidance and 
informal networks. Of course, the government-business relationship "... can have 
many dimensions and take many forms" [Yamamura (1982), p.77]. This is also true 
for the informal part of this relationship. The limitation to administrative 
guidance and informal networks is dictated by the frequent and persistent 
attention for these two informal components in studies on the Japanese political 
economy and economie system. In the existing literature, administrative guidance 
and informal networks are the central elements in analyses of the relevance of 
informal factors in the Japanese public-private sector economie relationship, or 
in other words in Japanese economie policy. 
3
 One rare exception of this general trend was an American investment 
banker, who stated that "... an important aspect of informal control is the 
timing, but informal controls as instruments are not of sübstantial 
importance". Personal interview, June 1992, Tokyo. 
° Personal interview, August 1990, Tokyo. 
' Personal interview in the Netherlands, March 1991. 
Personal interview, September 1992, Tokyo. 
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First, informal government intervention in Japan is often identified with non 
legal intervention, that is intervention without explicit legal backing'. This 
informal, non-legal intervention has become famous under the name of admini-
strative guidance Tgyoosei shidool. Administrative guidance, in lts official 
version explained, means that "... government institutions want specific parties 
to act or not to act in a specific way, within the primary or secondary task of 
these government institutions, by realising guidance, strong advice, weak advice 
or other measures without legal coercive power"!", ^he central characteristic 
of administrative guidance is the non-legal enforceability: compliance by the 
recipiënt of the governmental guidance is from a strict legal perspective 
voluntary - that is, without formal legal coercion. Thus, the criterion whether 
or not a government action should be typified as administrative guidance is 
clearly a legal one. Furthermore, administrative guidance is an instrument of 
government intervention, that is to say is used to implement government poli-
cies. Section 3.3 will be devoted to an analysis of administrative guidance. 
The other major component of the informal part of the public-private sector 
relationship is constituted by the existence of informal networks based on 
personal relations f j inmvakul. These personal relationships are links between 
the government bureaucracy and business executives which result from common 
backgrounds as regards former employer, university, place of birth, family, etc. 
According to Okimoto (1989), these "... informal, personal relationships between 
bureaucrats and business leaders . . . function as channels of communication 
between the public and private sectors and as mechanisms for bridging the divide 
between "frame" organizations in Japan^-". The criterion to distinguish these 
personal networks is the sharing of a common background, which establishes 
specific personal or private relationships. Essential is the non-transparent 
character of the use of these networks in economie policy. From the perspective 
y
 This identification of informal with non-legal is being supported by 
for example Murakami (1987), p.46 [informal "... that is, not legally 
enforceable"], Murakami and Rohlen (1992), p.91 [informal is "... no legal 
ground for compulsory affiliation"] and Kumon (1992), p.126 ["... less 
formal (not established by law)]". See also Upham (1987), p.22. 
•*•" Juristo (1991), p.74: Administrative Procedures Law, Outline of 
Bill (The first sectional meeting draft) (July 26, 1991). Translated from 
original Japanese text [Gyoosei Shidoo Tetsuzuki Hoo Yookoo An (Dai Ichi 
Tsugi/Shi Bukai An) (Heisei 3 Nen 7 Gatsu 26 Nichi). 
Okimoto (1989), p.236. 
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of economie policy, their usefulness as mechanisms to reach consensus in the 
policymaking process is being emphasized, whilst some scholars also stress the 
importance of informal networks for implementing policy. That is, informal 
personal networks could be used as instruments of govemment control over the 
economie system: they are a kind of proxy variables for the use of admini-
strative guidance. Informal networks will be discussed in section 3.4. 
Concludingly, the attention for informality in economie policy, such as being 
interpreted in Japanese (political) economie studies, is commonly limited to two 
components: non-legal intervention and informal networks. The common denominator 
is generally the dimension of non-transparency: informal is identified with 
private, the absence of disclosure. This is sometimes negatively interpreted as 
the existence of a sneaky and secretive bureaueracy that uses informal, in the 
sense of non-transparent and undisclosed, instruments to its own discretion. 
However, scholars such as for example F.K. Upham and D. Okimoto emphasize the 
positive aspects of an informal, i.e. "behind the scène", consultative and 
consensual policymaking process which includes a small number of participants, 
an informal consultative and cooperative interdependent relationship that also 
remains important in the implementation stage of govemment policies-^: in the 
words of Noble (1989), p.68, "... informal but intense links", in the meaning of 
"... informal, bureaucratically-sponsored negotiation" [Noble (1989), p.70] 
between govemment and business are the heart of Japanese economie and social 
policy. 
As will become clear, the non-transparency issue is relevant for the major part 
of administrative guidance. Of course, it is particularly relevant for, and even 
the major characteristic of informal networks. It Is extremely hard to teil if 
and to what extent personal relationships, based on specific common backgrounds, 
are used in the making and implementation of economie policy. The aspect of non-
transparency is an essential dimension of informality, and frustates an objecti-
ve judgement of the issue. 
From an economie perspective, the use by the govemment economie bureaueracy of 
x z
 Upham (1987), p.167-168, states regarding Japanese industrial 
policy that the contact between bureaucrats and business is "... furthered 
by an informal, consultative policymaking process that encourages the 
formation of personal relationships across institutional boundaries. ... 
The underlying precondition for this state of cooperative interdependence 
of govemment and business in Japan is the informal and bipolar nature of 
the process of industrial policy. Policy is set and then implemented with 
the constant participation of and consultation with the private sector". 
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non-transparent informal instruments can be interpreted as the existence of a 
government intervention mechanism behind the official market mechanism. In other 
words, if Japanese economie policy is characterized as informal in the meaning 
of non-transparent, an unknown and unspecified part of government intervention 
in the economie system is hidden from the view of economie markets. In this 
respect, informal economie intervention could be typified as non-market economie 
intervention. 
Finally, a major problem with informality as a concept in Japanese political-
economic studies is the ad-hoe use of different interpretations at different 
places in a specific study, quite often without explicit explanation. For 
example, according to Upham (1987), p.l98f, the characteristics of Japanese 
bureaucratie informality include aspects such as "... the creation and operation 
of wide-ranging administrative systems with little or no statutory basis", and a 
legal environment that results in "... a judicially unaccountable bureaucracy 
that operates without clear statutory limits", which have a clear legal basis. 
But is also contains "... frequent informal consultations" between the members 
of deliberation councils f Shingikail , that is informal in the meaning of 
consultations beyond the formal procedural meetings, informal in the sense of 
"behind the scène" non-official negotiations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of the significance and 
relevance of informal factors in Japanese economie policy, following the various 
interpretations of the Japanese economie system which were presented in chapter 
two. 
First, in the next section, some reasons for the alleged importance of informal 
factors in Japan will be presented. 
Second, the two major alleged informal components of Japanese economie policy 
will be discussed: administrative guidance in section 3.3 and informal networks 
in section 3.4. 
A final section will be devoted to concluding remarks. 
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3.2 The Alleged Importance of Informality in Japan 
"The informal system, the driving force of Japanese activities, is a native 
Japanese brew, steeped in a unique characteristic of Japanese culture" 
Nakane (1970)13 
The purpose of this subsection is to investigate why according to a significant 
number of scholars informal factors are important in the contemporary Japanese 
economie system. The analysis will be brief, mainly because a large number of 
explanations are embedded in sociological and anthropological frameworks, which 
are beyond the scope of this study. It also has to be emphasized that this 
analysis by no way claims that informal factors are only a "unique" Japanese 
phenomenon. What the analysis in this subsection does provide is a survey of 
studies which stress why informal factors in the Japanese political economy and 
economie system are important, and therefore provides the argument firstly for 
the inclusion of informal factors in an economie study and secondly for an 
investigation of the actual relevance, importance and effectiveness of a 
specific number of informal factors in Japanese monetary policy. 
The reasons for the alleged importance of informal factors can be classified in 
two, partly interrelated groups: a group of legal explanations and another group 
consisting of social-cultural explanations. 
The legal line of reasoning, related to the legal dimension of informality, has 
its main supporter in the work of J.0. Haley, who emphasizes strongly the 
importance of informal, i. e. not based on explicit laws, enforcement of govem-
ment policies in Japan. According to Haley (1986), (1991) and (1992), the "... 
persuasive resort to informal enforcement in Japan is best explained by two 
factors: the predominance of promotional as opposed to regulatory policies and 
the weakness of formal law enforcement"^. In Japan, industry is assisted by 
promotional govemment intervention, and almost not hampered by restrictive 
economie regulation. Furthermore, as a result of "... Japan's peculiar histori-
cal experience" and "... the impact of Occupation reforms", the Japanese bureau-
cracy lacks explicit legal controls, which have resulted in "... the strength of 
Nakane (1970), p.154. 
Haley (1991), p.163. 
8 
extralegal forms of social and economie ordening" [Haley (1992), p.58]", The 
reforms of the Suprème Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) during the occupation 
of Japan after WWII limited the legal powers of the economie bureaucracy 
significantly. As a result, the promotional orientation of economie policy and 
the lack of formal legal power impel the bureaucracy to resort to cooperative 
policymaking and administrative guidance: "These two factors not only force 
reliance on administrative guidance as an informal means of implementing policy, 
but by the same token significantly curtail the autonomy of the bureaucracy in 
formulating policy. Both the aim of as sist ing industry and a lack of strong 
legal sanctions or other forms of formal legal coercion in effect compel 
officials in Japan to negotiate and compromise with respect to the policies they 
seek to implement"^, Haley (1991), p.166, concludes: "The avoidance of legal 
regulation and coercive state control must be viewed as among the most prominent 
characteristics of governance in postwar Japan"17. 
Social-cultural explanations of the alleged importance of informal factors in 
Japanese society and economie system stress the importance of such aspects as 
consensus, perception of vulnerability, avoidance of conflict and confrontation 
in public, and other social-cultural factors*8. As has been analyzed in chap-
ter two [subsection 2.2.4], the consensual policy school puts forward the notion 
that consensus is the basis of the functioning of the Japanese political-
economic system and not binding rules and laws. This socio-cultural preference 
f or consensus and reliance on informal bargaining has been reinforced by "... 
" According to others, mainly Japanese scholars, the lack of explicit 
legal controls in Japan "... is considered to be a reflection of either 
traditional attitudes or "deep culture"" [See Haley (1992), p.57]. Some 
western scholars, in particular Upham and Young, explain the lack of legal 
means in terms of bureaucratie power: the bureaucracy could prevent the 
development of legal means (such as litigation), and consequently maintai-
ned its power by the use of informal policymaking and implementation. See 
Haley (1992), p.58, and Ramseyer (1985). 
1 6
 Haley (1991), p.163 [and Haley (1992), p.58]. See furthermore 
Johnson (1982), p.264-265, Haley (1989), p.130-131, and Haley (1991), p.155 
and p.157. 
l^ The importance of informal factors is also caused by the general 
and universal character of Japanese laws. Subsection 3.3.1 will pay 
attention to this aspect. 
1° See among others Davis (1972), p.9-10, and especially Research 
Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992). 
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Japan's perception of vulnerability"^-'. The attention for consensus is also to 
be found in discussions on the importance of legal contracts in Japan. According 
to a number of studies, not formal contracts but societal norms, based on 
consensus, in combination with personal, informal negotiations and agreements, 
structure Japanese society2". 
Furthermore, social-cultural explanations of informality in Japanese society and 
economie system emphasize the importance of human relationships \jinmyakul and 
resulting informal networks. For example Nakane (1970), p.144, notes that "... 
Japan has no native concept of 'organization' or 'network' abstracted or 
divorced from actual man; 'organization' is perceived as a kind of succession of 
direct and concrete relationships between man and man". According to Pye (1985), 
human relationships are central in Japan: "... patterns of relationship which 
are never formally institutionalized in a legal sense can become as rigid and 
firmly entrenched as the formal rules and institutions of the West" [Pye (1985), 
p. 287] 21. Attention for inf ormal networks can also be found in the pluralistic 
network model, departing from the concept of social exchange, which has been 
discussed in sübsection 2.2.5 of the previous chapter. Another school which 
focuses strongly on informal networks is the consensual policy school, of which 
D. Okimoto is one of the leading adherents. According to Okimoto (1989), the 
factors behind the importance of informal, personal networks in Japan are a 
frame society based on consensus rather than legal codes, the Confucian stress 
placed on human relations, particularly the emphasis on loyalty and trust, 
social homogeneity, the logistical convenience of Tokyo as the hub of both 
political and economie activity and the role of the educational system as the 
iy
 Okimoto (1989), p.32. See further for example Pye (1985), p.288 and 
Johnson (1982), p.274. 
2 0
 Yamamoto (1992), p.49, declares:" it is not the contract that 
has binding force. It is extralegal, supracontractual societal norms that 
keep Japanese in line." See also Nakane (1970), p.79, 82-83, and Okimoto 
(1989), p.159. The discussions of social norms and organization are 
embedded in cultural-historie theories on the ordening of the traditional 
Japanese village [Mura], in which informal social relationships and 
consensual governance, in other words social controls and not legal 
controls, provided the binding and stabilizing mechanisms. These social 
controls "... have in effect become the models for corporate and bureaucra-
tie organization and control. In the process the patterns of control of the 
mura have become the predominant patterns of governance for the nation" 
[Haley (1991), P.175]. See among others Nakane (1970), p.62, Murakami 
(1987), p.35-36, Haley (1991), Haley (1992), p.42f, and Imai (1992), p.230. 
2 1
 See also Keehn (1990), p.1033, and Van Wolferen (1991), p.l88f 
[Dutch pocket edition]. 
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central mechanism for elite selection and social mobility22. His conclusion is 
clear: "This combination of factors appears to make Japan perfectly suited to 
the informal, non-legalistic policymaking that is a hallmark of its administra-
tive apparatus"23. 
In the next sections, the two major alleged informal components of economie 
policy in Japan, i.e. administrative guidance (3.3) and informal networks (3.4), 
will be discussed. 
2 2
 Okimoto (1989), p.156. 
2 3
 Okimoto (1989), p.156. 
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3.3 Informal Aspects of Economie Policy I: Administrative Guidance 
One of the most discussed components of government intervention in the Japanese 
economie system is the vague, sometimes ill-defined set of informal instruments 
commonly specified as administrative guidance [gyoosei shidool. Praised by some 
as an important explanation of the Japanese economie "miracle"24, and critici-
zed by others as unlegal government intrusion in the private sector", the 
word administrative guidance has been used frequently by government agencies and 
in the mass media, but was until recently not an official legal technical 
term". According to some estimates, the use of administrative guidance is 
significant and widespread: Young (1984) refers to commentators who estimate 
that administrative guidance "... comprises over eighty percent of Japanese 
bureaucratie activity", and Schaede (1992) states that "Informal industry 
estimates are that this regulatory practice constitutes 60-90% of all regulation 
of a given industry"27. However, as will become clear, regarding its effecti-
veness, the opinions differ greatly. 
3.3.1 Definition and Classification 
To clarify the concept of administrative guidance, in figure 3.1 the definitions 
in some of the major studies in the field are shown. Comparison of these 
definitions and their underlying literature leads to the following conclusions. 
First, most studies accept the legal criterion of informality in the sense of 
being not legal: administrative guidance is interpreted as government actions 
without formal legal coercion, that is compliance with these actions by reci-
pients is from a strict legal perspective voluntarily. From a legal point of 
view, the recipients are free to ignore the guidance. This also implies that 
these regulated parties presumably are "... not forced to perform without 
consent, nor are they punished If they do not"28. As will be discussed below, 
2 4
 See for example Johnson (1982), p.318. 
2
-* For example, personal interview former senior executive Japan 
Federation of Business Organizations [Keidanren], January 1993, Tokyo; 
personal interview senior executive leading city bank, July 1993, Tokyo. 
" This changed with the introduction of the Administrative Procedures 
Bill fGyoosei Tetsuzuki Hooi in 1993. 
2 7
 Young (1984), p.954, and Schaede (1992), p.9. However, empirical or 
other support to back up these rough estimates is not presented. 
2 8
 Henderson (1973), p.202. This aspect is supported in Narita (1968), 
Davis (1972), Johnson (1982), Young (1984), Eads and Yamamura (1987), 
Murakami (1987), Upham (1987), Wakiyama (1987), Kitagawa (1989), Okimoto 
(1989), Minami (1990), üekusa (1990), Haley (1991) and Juristo (1991). 
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Figure 3.1 Definitions of administrative guidance 
Ackley and Ishi (1976), p.236: "Administrative guidance involves the use of 
influence, advice, and persuasion to cause firms or individuals to behave in 
particular ways that the government believes are desirable". 
Ballon and Tomita (1988), p.27: "Administrative guidance might be understood 
along the lines of the pre-Meiji tradition in which the samurai, or warrior-
bureaucrat, makes, interprets, and administers the "law" (as a rule of equity)". 
Bingham (1989), p.82: "... is a varied and ill defined combination of informal 
techniques by which a ministry carries out its responsibilities and gets what it 
wants". 
Davis (1972), p.1: "... "Administrative guidance", a simple though by no means 
perfect definition, would be a request by administrative body for voluntary 
cooperation". 
Eads and Yamamura (1987), p.433: "Administrative guidance is non-legally binding 
guidance issued by ministries mostly in written fora but on occasion orally". 
Haitani (1976), p.48: "Administrative guidance is a unique Japanese practice, 
according to which government officials or agencies guide industries and firms 
in desired directions by informal means and without specific statutory authori-
ties". 
Haley (1991), p.160: "Administrative guidance is defined quite simply as advice 
or direction by government officials carried out voluntarily - that is, without 
foraal legal coercion - by the recipiënt". 
Henderson (1973), p.201: "..., "guidance" means action by which administrative 
agencies influence parties through voluntary, nonauthoritative - as opposed to 
legally coercive - means to cooperate willingly with the agency's guidance 
toward what is academically called "integration of the social order". 
Hollerman (1988), p.176: "... a nonstatutory regulatory technique used by 
administrators to secure "voluntary" compliance with their wishes". 
Johnson (1982), p.265: "It refers to the authority of the government, contained 
in the laws establishing the various ministries, to issue directives (shijj.), 
requests (yooboo), suggestions (kankoku), and encouragements (kanshoo) to the 
enterprises or clients within a particular ministry's jurisdiction. ... although 
it is not based on any explicit law, it cannot violate the law". 
Juristo (1991): Administrative Procedures Law, Outline of Bill (The first 
sectional meeting draft) (July 27, 1991), p.74: "Under this law, administrative 
guidance means that government institutions want specific parties to act or not 
to act in a specific way, within the primary or secondary task of these govern-
ment institutions, by realising guidance, strong advice, weak/ordinary advice or 
other measures without legal coercive power". 
13 
Kitagawa (1989), p.135: "Administrative guidance may be defined as a set of acts 
leading a person or organization with his or its voluntary cooperation and 
consent so that the administrative agency's intent may be realized". 
Matsushita and Schoenbaum (1989), p.31: "... a phrase used by journalists, 
businesspeople, and government officials to describe a category of informal 
regulation of private industry that is widespread in Japan". 
Minami (1990), p.99: "Gvoosei shidoo is a guidance which is given to the people 
by an administrative organ. It is called instruction (shiji'), recommendation 
(kankoku), warning (keikoku), advice (shiji), attention (chui), guidance 
(shidoo). etc" [italics added]. 
Murakami (1987), p.46-47: "A close informal relationship existed among all 
parties concerned, including the ministry of jurisdiction and all firms in the 
industry in question. This bundie of characteristics is aptly summarized in the 
concept of gvoosei shidoo ("administrative guidance") [italics added 
AvR],...". 
Narita (1968), p.353: "Administrative guidance is understood as the action of 
administrative organs in respect to matters within a certain administrative 
field, in executing statutes by applying them, and in ordering strong measures 
against and otherwise compelling, specific individuals, juristic persons and 
associations; where there is voluntary compliance and a statutory basis of 
action, in guiding, suggesting, and advising; and where there is voluntary 
compliance but no statutory basis of action, in influencing the parties' 
voluntary cooperation and consensual performance by expressing, as an admini-
strative organ, the expectation and wish that something should exist or be done 
in certain way". 
Okimoto (1989), p.93: "... informal guidance issued by MITI and other government 
ministries to help specific industries deal with vexing short-term problems that 
threaten to harm the collective interest". 
Trezise and Suzuki (1976), p.784: "... administrative guidance, under which an 
offical or an agency, without having specific legal authority to do so, might 
direct or induce private persons to take or refrain from certain actions". 
Upham (1987), p.168: "... various informal, legally voluntary modes of persuasi-
on, generically known as administrative guidance, to convince individual firms 
or groups of firms to comply with Ministry policy". 
Wakiyama (1987), p.211: "Administrative guidance is defined as an administrati-
ve' s action, without any coercive legal effect, which encourage related parties 
to act in a specific way in order to realize some administrative aim". 
Young (1984), p.923: "Administrative guidance occures when administrators take 
action of no coercive legal effect that encourges regulated parties to act in a 
specific way in order to realize some administrative aim". 
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the question is if compliance is from a practical point of view really "volunta-
ry". 
Furthermore, the government agency does not need specific statutory authority 
for using its guidance. However, it must not act beyond its specific field of 
administrative concern29. 
Third, administrative guidance is seen to be given by government agencies to 
regulated parties with the aim of modifying their behaviour in a specific 
30 wayJU. 
Finally, the government agency uses only expressions of expectations or wishes, 
and not legal orders. In this sense, administrative guidance can be interpreted 
as a fora of "moral suasion"3-'-. 
The use of administrative guidance is in some studies perceived as "unique" to 
Japan, an inforaal fora of government intervention that would not work in 
Western countries like the United States32. p0r example, Johnson (1993), p.56-
57, quotes S.Hoshino, former vice-minister of the Economie Planning Agency, who 
declares that "Non-transparant methods such as the Japanese government's admini-
strative guidance would have been regarded as 'unfair' outside of Japan ... and 
most likely could not function in the United States". Others, such as Narita 
(1968), take the view that in Western countries similar intervention modes 
• _33 existJ->. 
According to its purpose, administrative guidance can be classified in at least 
three different categories3 . First, promotional administrative guidance is 
2 9
 Henderson (1973), p.200-201, Narita (1968), Haitani (1976), Tresize 
and Suzuki (1976), Johnson (1982), Minami (1990) and Juristo (1991). 
3 0
 Young (1984), p.932, Narita (1968), Ackley and Ishi (1976), Haitani 
(1976), Tresize and Suzuki (1976), Wakiyama (1987), Minami (1990), Uekusa 
(1990), Juristo (1991) and Shindo (1992). 
3 1
 Henderson (1973), p.201, Narita (1968), Davis (1972), Ackley and 
Ishi (1976), Young (1984), Upham (1987), Wakiyama (1987), Haley (1991) and 
Juristo (1991). 
3 2
 Okimoto (1989), p.94. Supported by various interviews, 1992-1993. 
3 3
 For example, according to Narita (1968), p.354-355, the economie 
authorities in the United States and Geraany use administrative guidance-
like intervention mechanisms. 
3
^ The three-group classification is based on Minami (1990), p.100, 
Matsushita and Schoeribaum (1989), p.32, Narita (1968), p.371, and various 
interviews with legal scholars in September, October and November 1992, and 
July 1993, Tokyo. Kitagawa (1989), p.XII-137 and 138, distinguishes six 
15 
given to assist recipients and to promote their interests: the government as a 
"good father" Hosei shidool. Second, administrative guidance is used as an 
arbitrage mechanism to solve conflicts between parties Tchosei shidool. Third, 
administrative guidance is used to regulate the conduct of specific parties in a 
specific way: regulatory administrative guidance fkissei shidool. This kind of 
guidance has still the character of advice, but is used as a substitute for 
legal compulsion. In general, when administrative guidance is being discussed, 
it is mostly interpreted as regulatory guidance. 
Administrative guidance is practically conducted through directions [shjjjj , 
requests [yjooboo], warnings [keikoku], suggestions fkankokul and encouragement 
fkanshoo]^^. These measures are partly implemented through circulars or noti-
fications ftsuutatsu], other formalities and written statements [Narita (1968), 
p.365]. However, a significant part of the guidance is given orally, and some 
observers include even body-language of government bureaucrats3". This non-
transparant form of administrative guidance is said to include the most impor-
tant guidance, is the breeding ground for rumours and unspecified claims 
regarding its effectiveness, and gives administrative guidance its delicate and 
illustrious connotation3'. A number of interviewees even did not regard the 
published circulars [tsuutatsu] as administrative guidance: the dimension of 
non-transparency was for them an essential criterion to classify government 
different categories. An alternative classification considers whether or 
not there are statutory provisions that are the source of the authority of 
administrative guidance [Matsushita and Schoenbaum (1989), p.33f, and 
Narita (1968), p.365-370]. 
3 5
 Narita (1968), p.355, Henderson (1973), p.202, Johnson (1982), 
p.265, and Minami (1990), p.99. 
3
° Personal interviews Western scholar, September 1992, Japanese legal 
scholars September and October 1992, and former high-ranking staffmember 
Bank of Japan, January 1993, Tokyo. When private sector representatives are 
summoned to a ministry, the specific non-verbal communication by bureau-
crats, like attitude, etc, exemplifies their wishes and sends a clear 
message to the private sector. 
3
' Personal interviews Western and Japanese journalists, June, July 
and September 1992, Western and Japanese economie scholars September 1992, 
Japanese legal scholars September, October and November 1992, Tokyo. Also 
supported in literature, for example in Yamamura (1990), p.59. The issue of 
regulatory transparancy is one of the constant recurring topics in the 
bilateral American-Japanese negotiations (such as the Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative talks). 
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actions as administrative guidance-***. This interpretation of administrative 
guidance can also be found in most discussions in the media and empirical 
studies. 
The question whether or not tsuutatsu are part of administrative guidance is not 
clearly answered. According to some Japanese legal scholars and government 
bureaucrats, the public and general character of tsuutatsu disqualifies them as 
administrative guidance: "real" guidance is never writte.n down and is very 
directly oriented at a specific party-*'. Others include the tsuutatsu in admi-
nistrative guidance, because from a legal perspective the affected parties are 
not coerced to follow these circulars^ . This interpretation coincides with 
the definition of administrative guidance foliowed in this study, and therefore 
tsuutatsu will be classified as administrative guidance. To stress its transpa-
rent character, the tsuutatsu will be refered to as public administrative 
guidance. The non-transparent guidance is typified as private administrative 
guidance. 
The use of administrative guidance by the Japanese government bureaucracy is 
intertwined with the basic structure of the Japanese legal system. Japanese laws 
are usually short and very general: the actual interpretation is left to the 
discretion of government bureaucrats^. In the words of one of the intervie-
wees: "In Japan, the law is empty, the bureaucracy is king"^^. The lack of 
clear, explicit formal laws give rise to discretionary bureaucratie guidance: it 
has been left to the bureaucracy to interpret and implement the law. According 
to some scholars, this discretionary authority of the government bureaucracy is 
" Personal interview high-ranking staffmember Ministry of Finance, 
September 1992, Japanese legal scholars September and November 1992, June 
1993, former high-ranking staffmember Bank of Japan, January 1993. 
3* Interviews Japanese legal scholars September 1992 and June 1993, 
senior staffmember Ministry of Finance, September 1992. According to one 
legal scholar. tsuutatsu are part of administrative law fgvoosei rippool. 
and not of administrative guidance rgvoosei shidool. 
^° Personal interview Japanese legal scholar, October 1992, and senior 
staffmembers Ministry of Finance, February 1993, Tokyo. The view that 
tsuutatsu are part of administrative guidance is among others supported by 
Narita (1968), Davis (1972), Eads and Yamamura (1987), Schaede (1992) and 
(1993). 
^ Johnson (1982), p.273, 319. Personal interviews Japanese legal 
scholars, September and November 1992, and June 1993; Japanese banker, 
december 1992, Tokyo. 
Personal interview Japanese legal scholar, November 1992. 
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the most positive aspect of administrative guidance: firstly, the bureaucracy 
can act swiftly and flexible when confronted with new, unforeseen situations by 
avoiding red tape and complex and time-consuming legal procedures, and secondly, 
it can provide tailor-made solutions4^. 
3.3.2 Compllance 
Since administrative guidance can not be enforced by legal means, the question 
arises why recipients should comply with it. The answer is four-fold. 
First, a large number of studies stress the interactive and interdependent 
nature of administrative guidance: the guidance is not one-sidedly imposed by 
the bureaucracy, but usually the regulated parties are extensively involved in 
its formulation44. Young (1984), p.939, puts it as follows: "To assure volun-
tary compllance and substantial cooperation, agencies engage in practices 
designed to increase the informal, generally unreviewable input of parties into 
the regulatory process. Indeed, agencies that engage in administrative guidance 
undertake extensive consultations with regulated parties ... about the need for 
regulation and the form it will take". The informal consultations [nemawashi] 
make compliance with the guidance more likely: they are even said to be necessa-
ry to achieve compliance4^. 
Second, clients of the government bureaucracy sometimes request regulatory 
guidance. To some extent, this results from a paternalistic relationship between 
government and society: Japanese citizens and private organizations expect 
*" Ackley and Ishida (1976), p.239, Johnson (1982), p.273, 318-319, 
Young (1984), p.936-938, Wakiyama (1987), p.214-215, Matsushita and 
Schoenbaum (1989), p.40, and Shindo (1992), p.82-84. 
4 4
 Young (1984), p.935. According to Haitani (1976), p.49, "... 
administrative guidance is part and parcel of Japan's government-business 
symbiosis". Johnson (1978), p.23, interprets administrative guidance as a 
"... cooperative action between the government and private firms". Kosai 
(1987), p.586, concludes that "Consensus formation must precede administra-
tive guidance if it is to achieve its aim". Other studies that support this 
view are Murakami (1987) ["close informal relationship"], Wakiyama (1987) 
["close contact"], Ballon and Tomita (1989), Bingham (1989), Okimoto (1989) 
["prior consultations"], Upham (1991) and Shindo (1992). Also supported by 
various personal interviews. 
4 5
 Nemawashi can be translated as "To dig around the root of a tree to 
prepare it for transplanting". According to Hollerman (1988), p.178, "... 
the term refers to groundwork to enlist the support or informal consent of 
those concerned with a pending matter before asking for a formal decision". 
See also Ballon (1990), p.26-28. Inadequate consultation may result in non-
compliance [Young (1984), p.947-949, Wakiyama (1987), p.218]. 
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government action in times of trouble4". In other cases it is the result of 
private sector attempts to limit bureaucratie uncertainty or to protect specific 
interests4?. 
A third reason for compliance with administrative guidance is the alleged 
traditional submissiveness to authority and respect for the Japanese government 
bureaucracy4". Government bureaucrats are recruited among the best graduates 
from the most elite universities, and feel highly responsible to promote and 
serve the interest of their country. They even claim to "... speak for the 
national interest" [Johnson (1982), p.266]. 
Finally, regulated parties accept administrative guidance out of fear of 
government reprisal in case of non-compliance49: voluntary compliance should 
be "voluntary" compliance. Ministries have a wide range of powers and cover a 
large area of responsibilities, and consequently have numerous options for an 
effective carrot-and-stick strategy. In this sense, their so-called permissive 
authorization [kyokaninkal, like the authority to grant licenses, is important: 
if a recipiënt does not follow the ministerial guidance, the ministry can deny 
its approval to certain other activities, which are often unrelated to the issue 
at hand50. This idea is captured by the proverb "Enemies in Edo (Tokyo) are 
taken care of in Nagasaki f Edo no ada o Nagasaki se utsul" [Mouer
 and Sugimoto 
(1986), p.243-244]. In this respect, it has to be mentioned that the relations-
hip between administrative agencies and regulated parties is long-term and 
multifaceted, so it is in the self-interest of recipients of administrative 
guidance to keep this relationship as good as possible, i.e. to comply5 . 
However, it also has to be mentioned that the guidance should be impartial if 
4 6
 Shindo (1992), p.79f. 
4
^ Keehn (1990), p.1030, personal interviews high-ranking staffmembers 
Ministry of Finance, July 1992, February 1993; Western economie scholar, 
September 1992; Japanese banker, December 1992; former high-ranking 
staffmember Bank of Japan, January 1993, Tokyo. 
4 8
 Upham (1991), p.325, and Johnson (1982), p.266. Supported in Ackley 
and Ishi (1976), p.237, and Matsushita and Schoenbaum (1989), p.33. 
4 9
 See for example Haitani (1976), p.49, Johnson (1982), p.266, Eads 
and Yamamura (1987), p.433, and Matsushita and Schoenbaum (1989), p.33. 
Personal interviews Japanese legal scholars September 1992 and June 1993. 
5 0
 Mouer and Sugimoto (1986), p.243. See also Murakami and Rohlen 
(1992), p.92. Personal interviews Japanese legal scholars September 1992 
and June 1993. Johnson (1982), p.70, uses the terminology of kyoninkaken. 
5 1
 Eads and Yamamura (1987), p.433, and Murakami and Rohlen (1992), 
p.93. 
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compliance is to be reached: in cases of administrative bias in favour of 
particular parties or interests, non-compliance occurs^. 
The importance of kvokaninka differs from ministry to ministry: in a regulated 
industry like the financial services sector, the authoritative power of the 
Ministry of Finance is relatively big. On the other hand, the kvokaninka of MITI 
is said to be less substantial. Consequently, MITI implements its guidance much 
more by consensus, whereas the Ministry of Finance uses administrative guidance 
more by "order"^ . Against the background of fear of reprisal in case of non-
compliance, it Is questionable to which extent administrative guidance is really 
voluntary:"..., the crux of the matter is whether in any real sense one can say 
in each instance that compliance was in fact voluntary" [Henderson (1973), 
p.201]. 
The aspect of kvokaninka shows clearly that it is extremely difficult to discuss 
administrative guidance in general terms. Each administrative agency has its own 
specific form of administrative guidance, dependent on its statutory possibili-
ties and legal power base, and the structure of and developments in the specific 
private industry under its jurisdiction. 
3.3.3 Criticism 
Besides the problem that "... it is sometimes easy for administrative agencies 
to exceed the limits of voluntary action and to engage in actual coercion", 
administrative guidance has a number of other negative aspects^ . 
First, the lack of transparency of a substantial part of administrative guidance 
obstructs its supervision and deprives the general public of basic knowledge 
about the government's policy intentions. It gives rise to suspicions of 
Japanese society being "... a system in which vital decisions are made more or 
less in secret by a small coterie of bureaucrats and business leaders (many of 
them retired bureaucrats) who reflect a narrow range of political, economie, and 
educational backgrounds and interests" [Ackley and Ishi (1976), p.239]. The lack 
of transparency could result in the protection and promotion of specific 
interests, at the expense of the interests of the general public. 
Second, the lack of transparency and the absence of specific legal authority and 
clearly defined procedures opens the door to bureaucratie mistakes or even to 
5 2
 Young (1984), p.949, and Murakami and Rohlen (1992), p.93-94. 
*3 Personal interview Japanese legal scholar, June 1993, Tokyo. 
5 4
 Narita (1968), p.386. Based on Narita (1968), p.386-387, Ackley and 
Ishi (1976), p.329, Matsushita and Schoeribaum (1989), p.40-41, and Wakiyama 
(1987), p.225-226. 
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abuse of bureaucratie power. The use of administrative guidance is not circum-
scribed by any specific limits: the discretionary power of the bureaucracy could 
result in needless intervention and the implementation of policies without 
sufficiënt perspective. Furthermore, the specific content of administrative 
guidance is often decided at relatively low bureaucratie levels, which obstructs 
the formulation and implementation of coherent and clear policies^. 
3.3.4 Relevance of Administrative Guidance in Theoretical Schools 
To conclude this sübsection, an assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of 
administrative guidance will be made. This assessment differs sharply in 
accordance with the various interpretations of the Japanese economie system, 
such as presented in chapter two. 
First, the interventionist school argues forcibly in favour of administrative 
guidance. According to Johnson (1982), p.318, administrative guidance is "... 
perhaps the most important market-conforming method of intervention", one of the 
means of government control over the economie system-'*'. He presents evidence 
that "... MITI has on occasion retaliated with force against an enterprise that 
rejected its advice" [Johnson (1982), p.266], i.e. administrative guidance is 
accompanied by bureaucratie retaliation if necessary. Johnson thinks that as a 
result of liberalization, administrative guidance will decline, but that "... it 
will never disappear completely from the Japanese scène" [Johnson (1982), 
p.274], The alleged important role of administrative guidance is supported by, 
among others, Schaede (1992), p.5, where it is stated that "... the operative 
framework for the influence [of the government bureaucracy-AvR] is admini-
strative guidance". In conclusion, the interventionist school sees administra-
tive guidance as one of the most important instruments of economie policy, and 
emphasizes that compliance can be coerced by carrot and stick stategies. 
Second, not surprisingly, the opposite view is held by the adherents of the 
market school: according to their interpretation, the absence of formal legal 
means to force compliance limits severely the effectiveness of administrative 
guidance. The market school supporters doubt why private parties would comply 
with this guidance unless it is in their own interest". The clearest exponent 
of this view is J.O. Haley, whose perception that the use of administrative 
guidance in the postwar Japanese economie development was so weak and unsuccess-
-
}
-
5
 Personal interview former high-ranking staffmember Bank of Japan, 
August 1992. 
5 6
 Johnson (1978), p.22-23. 
5 7
 Upham (1991), p.325. 
21 
ful that the marketmechanism could survive, was presented in chapter two 
[subsection 2.3.4]. Other studies which subscribe to the doubt of the market 
school in the effectiveness of administrative guidance are Suzumura and Okuno-
Fujiwara (1987), Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (1988), Noble (1989), and Weinstein 
(1992)58 
The third model of the Japanese economie system, i.e. the consensual policy 
school, emphasizes the consensual character of administrative guidance: to 
achieve compliance with administrative guidance, prior consultations and 
consequent consensus are a prerequisite". Okimoto (1989), p.95, concludes 
that administrative guidance "... has receded in functional importance over the 
years, though it continues to be used as a low-key and informal policy instru-
ment" . 
The pluralistic network school, the last school presented in chapter two, 
accepts administrative guidance as an effective instrument that established a 
system of compartmentalized competition and consequently contributed signifi-
cantly to the postwar Japanese economie development. The government-business 
relationship can be analyzed from a social-exchange framework, which explains 
the compliance of business with administrative guidance in the post WWII 
economie development. However, the original reasons for the use of admini-
strative guidance, i.e. the danger of market instability and the threat posed by 
foreign competition, have receded significantly. As a result, "Administrative 
guidance is no longer legitimated ... by the environment" [Hurakami and Rohlen 
(1992), p.95]. 
It has to be mentioned that final conclusions regarding the effectiveness of 
administrative guidance have to distinguish between specific administrative 
agencies, specific regulated parties and specific periods of time"". 
-
10
 Suzumura and Okuno-Fujiwara (1987), p.60: "... the so-called volun-
tary compliance by private firms to the regulatory objectives could be 
obtained only when such objectives were largely consistent with private 
objectives. Even MITI could not force an unwilling horse to drink water". 
Noble (1989), p.92, states: "Indirect administrative guidance was 
ineffective". See also Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (1988), p.551. Some 
studies argue that administrative guidance was effective in some specific 
industries during the fifties and sixties, but that it has become ineffec-
tive due to liberalization and deregulation [Kosai (1987), p.591, Uekusa 
(1987), p.476, and Horne (1988a), p.152, 167]. 
5 9
 Upham (1987) and Okimoto (1989). 
"" Personal interview Western economie scholar, September 1992; high-
ranking staffmember Economie Planning Agency, September 1992, Tokyo. 
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3.4 Inforaal Aspects of Economie Policy II: Inforaal Networks"^-
In the analyses of the Japanese political economy and economie system in chapter 
two, it has been shown that in a significant number of studies the existence of 
informal networks based on personal relationships is one of the most notable and 
essential characteristics of the government-business relationship in Japan. 
Examples of these studies are Okimoto (1989), Kumon (1992), Murakami and Rohlen 
(1992) and Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), which all incorpo-
rate explicitly elements of the network approach. Other studies emphasizing the 
importance of personal networks are Boyd (1987), Taira and Wada (1987), van 
Wolferen (1989), Wilks and Wright (1991), Calder (1988) and (1993), and the 
large number of studies focusing on specific personal networks, which will be 
discussed below. For example, Taira and Wada (1987), p.264, draw the conclusion 
that "... the personal networks and contacts of public officials and private 
business leaders render the formal structural distinction of government and 
business almost meaningless in Japan". Calder (1993), p.271, concludes: "Govern-
ment-business networks in Japan deserve extended study in their own right, 
particularly at the micropolitical and microeconomic level. ... These networks 
play a crucial role in determining both policy and private-sector outcomes and 
Information flows". 
Regarding the interpretation and relevance of personal networks, various 
approaches can be distinguished. One approach departs from the existence of so-
called "factions" in Japanese society: "... influential coalitions predicated on 
common attributes" [Wiersema and Bird (1993), p.1002]. According to Kusayanagi 
(1969), "... all human relations in Japanese society are based on four kinds of 
"factions" (or batsu.): keibatsu (family and matrimonial cliques), kvoodobatsu 
(clansmen, or persons from the same locality), gakubatsu (school and university 
classmates), and zaibatsu (factions based on money)"°^. These personal rela-
tionships , based on specific common backgrounds, constitute human networks, of 
which especially gakubatsu and zaibatsu are said to be of great importance in 
6 1
 Only informal networks, based on personal relationships and rele-
vant for the public-private sector interrelationship, will be discussed. 
For example, no attention will be paid to so-called administrative net-
works, which are based on relationships between managers in private 
companies, and which are said to be particularly large-scale and prevalent 
in Japan. See Lifson (1992). 
62 As quoted from Johnson (1982), p.55. Zaibatsu schould not be 
confused with the industrial conglomerates of prewar Japan. The importance 
of cliques is among others supported by Haitani (1976), Kenrick (1988), 
p.27-34, and Van Wolferen (1991), p,188f [Dutch pocket edition]. 
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the government bureaucracy [Johnson (1982), p.55]. 
A somewhat different approach, presented for example in Imai (1992) and Research 
Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), follows the view that personal 
networks in Japan are strongly institution-oriented, rather than individual-
oriented. Imai (1992), p.228, notes that "... Japanese networks are built on the 
experiences people share by working in the same place or attending the same 
school. Relationships in such a network are linkages mediated through "place" in 
this sense". According to the Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), 
p.42, "..., in postwar Japanese society, relationships based on kinship and 
having the same home town have weakened, and intimate relationships of mutual 
trust based on frequent contact, that is, "relations of najimi (familiarity)," 
have come to fulfill an important role. Grouping has been furthered by relations 
of familiarity centering on occupation and workplace". 
These different approaches are united in the interpretation in Okimoto (1989). 
Okimoto distinguishes between ascriptive and functional networks based on 
personal relations. The ascriptive networks can be divided in the above mentio-
ned keibatsu. kvoodobatsu. and pakubatsu. and contacts through mutual friends 
and school club ties. Functional networks include friendships developed in the 
course of government industry contacts, participation in inforaal studygroups, 
and networks constituted by the post-retirement employment of Japanese govern-
ment bureaucrats in private business, the so-called "descending from heaven" 
famakudaril^^. Okimoto (1989), p.237, emphasizes the importance of personal 
networks in the formulation and implementation of industrial policy in Japan: 
"It would be hard to formulate and implement Japanese industrial policy if the 
labyrinth of personal relationships in the intermediate zone [between public and 
private sector-AvR] did not exist". 
In the literature, and supported by personal interviews, the attention for the 
relevance of informal networks in the public-private sector (inter)relationship 
is especially focused on amakudari. and to a lesser extent on gakubatsu. Because 
of this emphasis, and the fact that objective data regarding these two specific 
networks are available, the analysis of informal networks will be limited to 
amakudari and gakubatsu. 
Okimoto (1989), p.156. 
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3.4.1 Amakudari"^ 
A study of the phenomenon amakudari is hampered by a number of difficulties. 
First, the "human dimension" of amakudari complicates objective and independent 
research. In a significant number of interviews, especially those with active 
and retired staffmembers of the MoF and BoJ, the interviewees were quite 
reluctant to discuss the issue. In neither MoF nor BoJ was it possible to get 
the data regarding their amakudari kanrvo (retired bureaucrats in private sector 
positions) through official channels". Amakudari is a delicate topic: the 
acceptance of highly paid jobs after retirement by former government bureaucrats 
raises suspicious feelings among the general public and media of possible con-
flicts of interests"^. To put it more bluntly: according to the "man in the 
street", amakudari could be interpreted as the existence of a small and privile-
ged group of former civil servants who line their pockets by using relations 
built up during public service^. Against the background of these feelings, it 
b
^ The following analysis is for the most part based on Johnson (1974) 
and (1978), Haitani (1976), Johnson (1982), Blumenthal (1985), Taira and 
Wada (1987), Aoki (1988), Ballon and Tomita (1988), Hellmann (1988), 
Hollerman (1988), Horne (1988a), Prestowitz (1988), Calder (1989), Okimoto 
(1989), van Wolferen (1991), Schaede (1992) and (1994), and Inoki (1993). 
The importance of amakudari is further supported by personal interviews 
with among others Japanese legal scholars, September and October 1992; 
Western economie scholar, September 1992; Japanese banker (president), 
December 1992; former senior manager Keidanren, January 1993; staffmembers 
Ministry of Finance, January and February 1993; staffmembers Bank of Japan, 
August, October and December 1992, February, April, May and June 1993; 
Western banker (vice-president), June 1993, Tokyo. Personal correspondence 
with number of Western and Japanese scholars. 
" In a personal interview, October 1992, a Japanese political scholar 
mentioned a similar experience: with the rare exception, he did not manage 
through the official channels to get the information on amakudari positions 
at industrial federations. He stated that "... our Japanese scholars do not 
have information regarding amakudari". 
°° The delicate nature of amakudari forces even one author not to use 
the word. In his excellent study of the Japanese financial system, J. Horne 
states: "The Japanese often use the phrase amakudari [italics added-AvR], 
which literally means 'descend from heaven'. I have avoided use of the word 
in line with this book's aim of producing an analysis understandable to the 
non-Japanese specialist but also because the word is often used with 
pejorative connotations" [Horne (1985), p.263]. A good example of the 
suspicious feelings surrounding amakudari can be found in Johnson (1974), 
p.955. Regarding the report on amakudari published by the National Person-
nel Authority, Johnson mentions that in the media it "... provoked bitter 
comments: it raised suspicions that bureaucrats on active duty but looking 
ahead to retirement, as well as those already retired, might be more 
interested in protecting the interests of businesses than of the public". 
" Personal experience from various interviews with Japanese citizens 
who are not directly involved, April 1992-July 1993. 
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is not surprising that directly involved persons and institutions are reluctant 
to discuss the issue. 
Second, the specific characteristics of definitions of amakudari used by various 
authors differ. In figure 3.2, a number of these definitions are presented. 
Comparison of the characteristics shows a number of differences (and sometimes 
even inconsistencies). The most remarkable one is the distinction in the nature 
of the corporations which offer the post-retirement positions: some authors 
limit their definition to private companies" , whereas others include public 
corporations as well" . To add to the confusion, Johnson and Okimoto use both 
definitions at different places7". Furthermore, Hollerman (1988) and Home 
(1985a) mention explicitly the involvement of career bureaucrats only; other 
studies are more ambiguous about the difference between career and non-career 
buraucrats among the amakudari kanrvo. Finally, some püblications, for example 
Van Wolferen (1989), Schaede (1992) and Prestowitz (1988), refer to descending 
into "leading" or "large" companies. Other studies, in particular Calder (1989), 
do not exclude medium and smaller companies explicitly. Against the background 
of the financial context of this thesis, it is interesting to note that accor-
ding to Van Wolferen (1989), Schaede (1992) and Prestowitz (1988), Japanese 
bureaucrats accept positions "... as executive of a large ... bank", "... in the 
board of a leading bank" and "... in a large bank" respectively' . These 
differences in definitions of amakudari obstruct comparative studies and the 
interpretation of data. 
3.4.1.1 Definition and Classification of Post-Retirement Employment 
In this study, amakudari involves the acceptance of high-level positions by 
retired career bureaucrats from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) FOokurashool and 
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) fNihon Ginkool in private banks. Especially the post-
retirement positions of career bureaucrats are important: these officials are 
the elite and assume the most lucrative and leading positions among the reti-
rees. Although staffmembers of the BoJ are not real civil servants, they are 
included in this study for two reasons: firstly, the Japanese government, i.e. 
b ö
 For example Hollerman (1988), Johnson (1974), Okimoto (1988) and 
Upham (1987). 
6 9
 Aoki (1988), Calder (1989), Haitani (1976), Horne (1985a), Johnson 
(1978), Okimoto (1989), and Prestowitz (1988). 
7 0
 Compare Johnson (1974) with Johnson (1978), and Okimoto (1988) with 
Okimoto (1989). 
7 1
 Schaede (1992), p.10, and Prestowitz (1988), p.113. 
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Figure 3.2 Definitions of amakudari 
Aoki (1988), p.265: "... bureaucrats who quit the bureaucracy after attaining 
positions higher than that of section director in the administrative hierarchy 
"descend from the heaven" (amakudari) of the elite bureaucracy . . . become 
available as human resources for national and local politics, business manage-
ment in private and public corporations, and other consulting activities". 
Blumenthal (1985), p.310: "... amakudari means "descent from heaven" and is used 
to describe the reemployment of government bureaucrats after the termination of 
their service with the government". 
Calder (1989), p.382: amakudari "... involves the widespread movement of 
national government bureaucrats from the "heaven" of elite government service to 
private firms, public corporations, local government, and the Diet after 
retirement from the national bureaucracy at around the age of forty-five to 
fifty-five". 
Haitani (1976), p.44: "The practice of higher administrators securing postcareer 
employment in business and public corporations is commonly known as amakudari". 
Hollerman (1988), p.175: "The government career civil service is alluded to as 
heaven, from which high officials retire at about age 55 to take senior positi-
ons in private business". 
Horne (1985a), p.163: "The retirement system in the government bureaucracy 
whereby many career bureaucrats retired between the ages of 50 and 55 to LDP 
Diet membership or to senior executive positions in companies for which their 
ministry had responsibility ... When bureaucrats took retirement jobs in 
industry or public companies, this was known as amakudari or 'descent from 
heaven"'. 
Johnson (1974), p.953: "The movement from ministry or agency to a private 
business is known as "descent from heaven" (amakudari)" [Johnson emphasizes the 
movement to private, profit-making enterprises]. 
Johnson (1978), p.5: "The practice of employing retired government officials as 
chief executives or members of boards of directors of public and private 
corporations". 
Okimoto (1988), p.319: "The reemployment of higher civil servants in high-level 
posts within the private sector (amakudari)" [Okimoto sees amakudari as "... 
perhaps the best unobtrusive indicator of relative bureaucratie power"]. 
Okimoto (1989), p.161: "The interpenetration of public and private is nowhere 
more graphically illustrated than in the well-known practice called amakudari. 
whereby officials leaving the bureaucracy "descend from heaven" into high-level 
posts in public corporations, industrial associations, and private industry" 
[amakudari as an informal policy network]. 
Prestowitz (1988), p.113: " ... amakudari (literally, "descent from heaven"). In 
this case, heaven is the bureaucracy, and the descent is into a posh position in 
a large bank or corporation, or possibly as head of another public body or a 
think tank". 
27 
Schaede (1992), p.10: "... amakudari. the "descent from heaven", where former 
bureaucrats, who on principle retire early, assume a position in the board of a 
leading bank or manufacturing firm or become the head of an industry associati-
on". 
Upham (1987), p.167: "When Japanese bureaucrats retire, most take positions in 
the private sector, many in the very firms they have been dealing with during 
their bureaucratie career - a process knovm as amakudari. or "descending from 
heaven"." 
the MoF, has a majority stake in the BoJ'*, which makes the BoJ part of the 
Japanese government bureaucracy, and secondly, the BoJ is responsible for the 
implementation of monetary policy and is consequently of great importance for 
the Japanese banking industry. The limitation to private corporations is in 
accordance with the clear classification of after-retirement employment of 
Japanese bureaucrats in Johnson (1974) and the requirements of the National 
Public Service Law (Kokka Koomuin Hoo). According to Johnson (1974) and (1978), 
the re-employment of Japanese bureaucrats after their retirement, virtually 
without exception in their early or mid-fifties, can be classified as fol-
lows'3. 
First, retired bureaucrats find new employment in private, profit-making 
companies. This movement is known as amakudari in the true sense, and is subject 
to minor legal restrictions. These restrictions are mentioned in article 103 of 
the National Public Service Law, which introduced for retiring bureaucrats a 
waiting period of two years between the moment of retirement from the bureaucra-
cy and the moment of accepting a position in a profit-making company, in case of 
a close connection between this company and the previous position of the retired 
bureaucrat'*. During these two years, the former government officials have to 
wait in temporary positions in unrelated businesses, universities or other 
nonprofit organizations. The National Personnel Authority has the authority to 
grant exceptions from the two-year waiting period, and publishes since 1965 an 
annual report on the number of retiring bureaucrats and the number of exemp-
tions, called Eiri Kipvoo e no Shuushoku no Shoonin ni kansuru Nenji Hokokusho 
/z
 Article 5, Bank of Japan Law. See EHS Law Bulletin Series (1991). 
7 3
 Johnson (1974), p.953-954, and Johnson (1978), p.102-103. 
7
^ According to Johnson (1974), p.954, article 103 states: "Personnel 
are hereby prohibited for a period of two years after leaving the public 
service from accepting or serving in a position with a profit making 
enterprise which involves a close connection with any ageney of the state 
. .. with which such persons were formerly employed within five years prior 
to separation from the service". 
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[Annual Report Concerning Approvals of Employment in Profit-making Enterpri-
ses]'^. According to Johnson (1974) and (1978), Schaede (1994) and various 
interviewees, the retiring bureaucrats who are subject to the screening procedu-
re by the National Personnel Authority constitute amakudari. 
Second, Japanese bureaucrats move after retirement into public corporations or 
so called special legal entities, i.e. enterprlses established by law and 
financed in part from public funds. This reemployment is called "sideslip" 
(vokosüberi'), because the retiring bureaucrat keeps a position in the public 
sector, and is not subject to legal restrictions. 
Third, retired bureaucrats find also new employment in the political world, 
called "position exploitation" fchii rivoo). The exploitation refers to the fact 
that political positions, such as member of the Diet, are "... usually open only 
to bureaucrats who served in choice national or regional posts that are particu-
larly suitable for building general political support" [Johnson (1974), p.954]. 
The Japanese Election Law puts forward some minor barriers to this after-retire-
ment employment'". 
Fourth, retired government officials accept high-level positions in non-profit 
oriented trade associations that represent specific industries. This fora of 
post-retirement employment is not subject to legal restrictions''. 
The fifth form of employment involves retired bureaucrats moving into so-called 
auxiliary organs (paikaku dantai). i.e. non-profit associations, foundations and 
institutes which are attached to a ministry and are often research-oriented. 
These organs function frequently as "waiting room" to spend the two-year waiting 
period before accepting a private sector position, and are sometimes used as the 
"last resort" for hard-to-place retirees. 
Finally, retiring bureaucrats accept positions in prefectural govemments' . 
This whole spectre of retired government bureaucrats in top-positions in private 
and public corporations, politics, local governments, academies and a motley 
collection of foundations and associations establishes a many-branched network 
for each of the major Japanese government organizations, commonly defined as 
their "Old Boy" (OB) network. The OB networks of the economie government 
7
-* Johnson (1974), p.954-955. Johnson notes that the enforcement of 
these legal restrictions is very lax. 
7 6
 Johnson (1978), p.104. 
7 7
 Johnson (1974), p.954. 
7 8
 Johnson (1978), p.102-103. 
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bureaucracies, more specific MITI, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of 
Japan, are extensively covered by very detailed Japanese language-sources' . 
However, these elaborate data-presentations have not reached the relevant 
English-language literature. With rare exceptions, claims regarding the impor-
tance and relevance of amakudari. i.e. the private sector part of the OB 
network, for specific industries, and statements about specific numbers of 
amakudari kanrvo are not backed by presentations and analyses of the relevant 
data8^. As a result, these conclusions are, as will become clear in chapter 
seven, often not precise. 
Against the focus of this study on the financial system and the public-private 
sector relationship, the analysis will be limited to amakudari in the private 
banking industry. 
3.4.1.2 Structure of the Bureaucracy and Amakudari 
Before discussing several interpretations of the significance of amakudari front 
a broader political-economie perspective, it has to be emphasized that as a 
consequence of its fundamental structure, the Japanese government bureaucracy 
needs the practice of post-retirement employment8*. 
First, the organization of the bureaucracy is based on strict seniority princi-
ples. New career civil servants enter a ministry as members of a specific class, 
a group of about 25 persons at large ministries such as MITI and MoF82. When 
one member of a class reaches the highest bureaucratie position possible, i.e. 
becomes administrative vice-minister fjimu-jikanl, the other members of his 
class in their early fifties must resign, leaving the vice-minister with 
absolute seniority. Furthermore, the principle of seniority is also important 
from the perspective of university background: graduates from a specific year 
are senior in rank to graduates of later years. The promotion schemes follow 
/y
 Regarding the BoJ, excellent coverage is provided by the yearly 
publication Seisaku Jihoo Shuppansha (1991), p.265-301. This publication 
mentions even the hobbies of the OBs, and crucial pieces of information 
such as their golf handicap. Similar publications also exist for the MITI 
and the MoF. 
8 0
 Johnson (1974), Blumenthal (1985) and Calder (1989) contain some 
data-presentations. Inoki (1993) has a good coverage of the movement of 
retired bureaucrats into public corporations. Regarding the actual number 
of amakudari kanrvo. Schaede (1994) offers the best available English 
language presentation. 
8 1
 Based predominantly on Johnson (1974), p.958-961, Johnson (1978), 
p.105-109, and Calder (1989), p.382. 
8 2
 Schaede (1994), p.10. 
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these seniority lines closely. This means that in case of the appointment of a 
new administrative vice-minister, senior graduates from the same university will 
have to retire. 
Second, the relatively low purchasing power of the postwar bureaucratie pay 
scales and pension system as compared with the private sector forces retiring 
bureaucrats to obtain post-retirement employment. For example, Rasmeyer and 
McCall Rosenbluth (1993), p.116-117, note that 1990 figures show a monthly mean 
national wage of Yen 357,000, compared with a roughly estimated mean career 
bureaucratie wage of Yen 318,000. Furthermore, these figures understate the 
actual differences: career government bureaucrats are recruited among the 
brightest graduates of the best universities, and consequently their potential 
private sector income is much higher than the mean national wage. 
As a result, the government bureaucracy must find every year a number of 
landing-spots for its retiring members. That is to say, amakudari is an institu-
tional bureaucratie phenomenon: the post-retirement positions of individual 
officials are arranged by the government bureaucracy, dependent on their final 
position in the bureaucratie hierarchy^. in this respect, amakudari differs 
from the private sector re-employment of Western civil servants, which is left 
to individual initiatives*5^. 
3.4.1.3 Theoretical Interpretations of Amakudari 
Regarding the theoretical interpretations of the political-economie importance 
of amakudari. five views can be distinguished: two stressing the importance of 
amakudari as a bureaucratie reward system, and three others focusing on its 
significance for the government-business relationship. 
The first view, explicitly discussed in Inoki (1993), and supported among others 
by Okimoto (1987) and Aoki (1988), regards amakudari as an important incentive 
mechanism and reward system within the Japanese government bureaucracy. Against 
the background of the potentially high financial rewards of after-retirement 
private sector employment, amakudari positions "... are provided as the final 
üi
 According to Johnson (1974), p.960, the finding of new jobs for the 
retiring bureaucrats is the responsibility of the Chief of the Minister's 
Secretariat fDaijin Kanbool : Aoki (1988), p.265-266, refers to the Person-
nel Section of the Minister's Secretariat. A different explanation is given 
in Schaede (1994), p.12, where it is said that the post-retirement posi-
tions are arranged by the National Personnel Authority. 
^ A Western country with a similar practice like amakudari is France, 
where large numbers of bureaucrats accept frequently and consistently 
positions in private sector industries. This movement is called "pantoufla-
ge" and according to Inoki (1993), p.5, is estimated to be about ten times 
more frequent than «tnaknriarl in Japan. 
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prize in the competition among bureaucrats in the ranking hierarchy"8 . These 
financial rewards can be considered as " ... a fora of deferred compensation 
whose values are determined on the basis of two factors: the officials' actual 
performance in ministries, and the rank of prestige of various ministries" 
[Inoki (1993), p.8]. As a result, from a strictly financial point of view, the 
government bureaucracy remains attractive for the best and brightest among the 
university graduates, and keeps its internal human resource allocation competi-
tive. 
The interpretation of amakudari as a reward system is also emphasized by 
Ramseyer and McCall Rosenbluth (1993), but then from the perspective of politi-
cal control over the government bureaucracy. These scholars argue, following 
basic pricipal-agent theory, that the LDP [the postwar leading political party] 
dominates and guides the bureaucracy"". According to Ramseyer and McCall 
Rosenbluth, the leaders of the LDP control the bureaucratie promotion scheme and 
the access to amakudari landing-spots. Consequently, given that "... bureaucrats 
potentially earn a large fraction of their lifetime wages in postbureaucratic 
jobs", government bureaucrats find it hard to ignore LDP preferences87. in 
other words, the LDP leaders can hold these bureaucrats hostage: amakudari 
positions are given as rewards for bureaucratie "good behaviour". 
Besides these views of amakudari as a bureaucratie reward system, three inter-
pretations focus on its importance for the government-business relationship. 
The first interpretation sees amakudari as an instrument for indirect government 
control or dominance over private industry, as a channel to exercise admini-
strative guidance88. This approach, for convenience's sake defined as the 
government control interpretation, is part of the interventionist school, and as 
such it has received considerable popular support in the Japanese and Western 
8 5
 Aoki (1988), p.266. 
8 6
 Rasmeyer and McCall Rosenbluth (1993), p.99-120. 
8 7
 Ramseyer and McCall Rosenbluth (1993), p.108. 
8 8
 This approach is explained correspondingly by Calder (1993), p.69, 
as follows: amakudari "... has often been seen as a mechanism for enhancing 
government dominance over the private sector". In Okimoto (1987), p.165, 
the interpretation of amakudari as an instrument of government control is 
described as an "elitist or conspiratorial" interpretation: amakudari as a 
governmental "Trojan horse". Mabuchi (1993), p.12, portrays this view as 
follows: "Career mobility from government to business is usually interpre-
ted as the consequence of government efforts to penetrate business decisi-
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media°9. Main Western proponents are C. Johnson, CV. Prestowitz, W.R. Nester, 
K. van Wolferen and U. Schaede9^. The government control interpretation of 
amakudari enlarges the set of potential instruments of economie policy with a 
network of strategically posltioned retired bureaucrats: amakudari as an 
additional instrument to implement government policies'l. For example, Johnson 
(1974), p.964-965, notes that from the point of view of the government, the "... 
placement of amakudari officials has been motivated not only by a desire to 
secure post-retirement employment for them but also as a matter of positive 
policy to enhance the effectiveness of administrative guidance". Amakudari "... 
is one aspect of their implementation of so-called administrative guidance". The 
focus of Johnson on the relationship between amakudari and government control is 
further illustrated by the title "Control and amakudari" of the chapter that 
deals with bureaucratie post-retirement employment in Johnson (1978)'2. in 
this study, p.114, Johnson argues that "Bureaucratie leaders occasionally have 
acknowledged that they use amakudari to serve policy purposes. ... in 1971, MITI 
placed one of its former vice-ministers, Kumagai Yoshifumi, on the board of 
Sumitomo Metals af ter a bitter dispute with that company in 1965, when it had 
refused to follow MITI's "administrative guidance" ". Schaede (1992), p.33, 
concludes that amakudari is one of the primary tools to implement administrative 
guidance: "... given the scope and relevance of administrative guidance in 
business regulation on the one hand, and the high number of amakudari board 
members on the other, it is safe to assume that bureaucrats constitute the most 
°' Various interviews leading Western journalists June 1992, Japanese 
legal scholar September 1992. 
9 0
 Johnson (1974) and (1978) and Schaede (1992) and (1994) will be 
discussed below. Nester (1990), p.139, notes that "The bureaucracy's 
policy-making and implementation power is further enhanced by the retire-
ment (amakudari) [italics added-AvR]) of bureaucrats into high paying 
positions in private and public corporations and the LDP". Prestowitz 
(1988), p.113, states that amakudari is "... a source of power for the 
ministry, which gains eyes and ears and even a mouth in the organizations 
to which its "old boys" graduate". Ballon and Tomita (1988), p.27-28, 
emphasize that amakudari helps the process of administrative guidance 
substantially. 
91 Although not a clear supporter of the government control interpre-
tation, the view of amakudari being an instrument of government policy is 
supported by Aoki (1988). On p.269, he notes explicitly that "The resources 
that a ministry can mobilize to implement its policy include . . . the 
network of its amakudari bureaucrats through which ministerial policy may 
be effectively propagated to the private sector". 
'2 On p.102, Johnson typifies amakudari as "By f ar the most notorious 
aspect of public corporate practice in Japan". 
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decisive factor in shaping day-to-day decisions of corporate Japan". The use of 
the amakudari network as a mechanism of government control over private business 
is also emphasized by various Japanese studies, for example Taira and Wada 
(1987) and Tsujinaka (1990). The former considers the "... administrative 
guidance of individual companies to make them conform to industrial policy" one 
of the "... official duties" of retired civil servants in private industry, and 
states that "It is commonly acknowledged that placement strategies and decisions 
are in part motivated by policy considerations" [Taira and Wada (1987), p.285-
287]. Tsujinaka (1990) notes that "Denied the path to a strong state based on 
hierarchical centralization and control under a statist ideology, the state 
bureaucracy turned toward the osmotic network system whereby more sophisticated 
and indirect means of control could be developed and systematized"'^. In his 
opinion, amakudari is one of these indirect means of control (along with 
administrative guidance, advisory councils and the like). 
It has to be mentioned, as various studies of the government control school 
emphasize, that the kind of potential government control exercised through 
amakudari has to be subtle and cautious: it is to some extent limited by the 
need of the bureaucracy to maintain good relations with its private sector 
constituency, in the sense of exchanging Information and "... maintaining 
coordination and cooperative interaction", and to ensure and safeguard future 
amakudari positions94. Nevertheless, the bottomline of the government control 
interpretation of amakudari is that it provides the government bureaucracy with 
an additional instrument to implement government policies. In other words, this 
approach emphasizes the viewpoint of the government, i.e. the supply-side of 
amakudari. and the implementation of its policies. The government control 
interpretation implies also the existence of a relatively powerful government 
bureaucracy, which implicitly and/or explicitly can force private business to 
accept its retiring members. 
A second school regarding the importance of amalfurlari in the government-business 
interrelationship is the "equalizing school", introduced by K. Calder and 
supported in Aoki (1988)95. This school interprets amakudari as a mechanism to 
y j
 As quoted from Inoki (1993), p.4. 
9 4
 Johnson (1978), p.113. See for example Taira and Wada (1987), 
p.287. Personal interview Japanese legal scholar, September 1992, Tokyo. 
These possible limitations to the use of amakudari as an instrument of 
government control are defended in Okimoto (1987), p.165. 
See especially Calder (1989). 
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equalize differences in access to bureaucratie information resulting from 
differences in corporate power and status between companies. For example, "... 
smaller firms in Japan have stronger incentives for wanting ex-bureaucrats and 
are willing to pay relatively more" because "... economically strategie informa-
tion is much more frequently unavailable from public sources in Japan than in 
Europe and the U.S9*>". This information sought for concerns likely regulatory 
bureaucratie actions as well as other more general economie and political mat-
ters9'. Differences between companies as regards corporate power and status, 
such as size of assets, location of headquarters, membership of a business group 
(Keiretsu) and university background of members of the Board of Directors, are 
reflected in having less developed connections with the government bureaucracy. 
Calder (1989), p.399, finds that "Bureaucrats move with greatest frequency to 
relatively small, non-Tokyo-based, non-Keiretsu affiliated firms with relatively 
small proportions of elite Tokyo University graduates in top management". 
According to Calder (1989), the largest firms in Japan value secrecy more, have 
their own channels for gathering nonpublic information and consequently do not 
need and even do not want retired bureaucrats: "..., Keidanren, the major banks, 
and many of the key manufacturing firms in the largest industrial groups all 
decline to take amakudari kanrvo98". In the words of a general manager of a 
leading Japanese bank: "If you don't need them, you don't want them99". 
Furthermore, ex-bureaucrats in private service fulfill an equalizing role in the 
sense of promoting constituent interests: «Tnaktidar^  " ... increases the range of 
9 6
 Calder (1989), p.395. 
9
' The idea of amakudari as a mechanism to get more information about 
likely regulatory bureaucratie actions is supported in Hollerman (1988) and 
Schaede (1994). In the view of Hollerman (1988), the private sector regards 
amakudari as an instrument to clarify government instructions. For example, 
in the case of the financial industry, the written guidelines of MoF 
(tsuutatsu) and the oral component of its administrative guidance are often 
regarded vague and unclear. Consequently, according to Hollerman, private 
banks are using their amakudari kanrvo to find out what the intentions of 
MoF's policies really are. Also Schaede (1994), p.32, argues that the 
retired and re-employed bureaucrats are used "... to ensure access to 
information in an environment of non-transparent regülation through 
administrative guidance". The difference with Calder"s equalization 
hypothesis lies in the f act that Hollerman and Schaede emphasize the 
private sector need for amakudari kanrvo because of the non-transparent and 
unclear character of the regulatory framework, whereas Calder focuses only 
on small and less-connected companies, which need amakudari to compensate 
for their information disadvantage with the government bureaucracy. 
9 8
 Calder (1989), p.396. 
9 9
 Personal interview with a former executive manager of the Keidan-
ren, January 1993. Supported by various other interviews. 
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actors who can obstruct what bureaucrats, especially the relatively young 
section level officials who actually make most policy, would like to do" [Calder 
(1989), p.397]. Taking into account the importance of seniority relations in the 
government bureaucracy and the fact that the present bureaucrats are the juniors 
of the present amaknrlari kanrvo. i.e. the former bureaucrats, amakudari esta-
blishes a "veto effect"100. 
The equalizing school emphasizes the demand-side of amakudari. and sees a 
relatively balanced relation between private and public sectors in the sense 
that private companies follow their own interests when considering whether or 
not to accept former bureaucrats101. On the whole, "Amakudari thus operates 
to broaden the access of the less-connected portion of the corporate world to 
government information, and frequently to co-opt and to undermine bureaucratie 
efforts at strategie dirigisme. It often constrains the bureaucrats, and thus 
complicates rather than reinforces their struggle for strategy" [Calder (1993), 
p.69]. In this sense, one can classify the equalizing view of amakudari as 
belonging to the market school interpretation of the Japanese economie system: 
amakudari improves the working of the marketmechanism by equalizing information 
disadvantages between private companies and obstructing government intervention 
by establishing a "veto effect". 
Finally, a third school can be distinguished. lts supporters, who belong to the 
consensual policy school, stress the importance of amakudari as a general 
mechanism for informal consultations and consensus building between public and 
private sectors102. 
1 0 0
 The use of amalmrlari as a mechanism to promote constituent inte-
rests is supported in Aoki (1989), p.266-267, and Schaede (1994), p.32. 
1 0 1
 In this respect, it has to be mentioned that inside recruitment 
for the leading positions is commonly preferred to outside appointments. 
Regarding the importance and custom of internal appointment of executives 
in Japanese companies, Odagiri (1992), p.43, notes that in almost all 
companies, "It is the norm to elect a director and then a president from 
inside the firm. Any deviation from this norm will greatly disappoint 
employees and damage their morale, as well as adversely affecting the 
quality of job applicants to the company. A typical example of such 
deviation has been the recruitment of retired senior government officials 
called amakudari [italics added-AvR], translated literally as Vdescend from 
heaven'. ünless such recruitment is expected to bring a significant 
benefit, or unless the incumbent manager is entirely dissatisfied with the 
quality of his subordinates, there will be no recruitment from outside." 
1 0 2
 It has to be mentioned that also Johnson (1978), p.113, and 
Schaede (1994), p.33 stress the importance of amakudari in this respect; 
Schaede even states that amakudari/Old Boys networks constitute a system of 
"consultative capitalism". However, Johnson and Schaede link amakudari 
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Examples of this interpretation are Okimoto (1989) and Upham (1987). Okimoto 
deflnes amakudari as a so-called informal policy network, i.e. networks "... 
based on personal relationshlps which bring government officials and leaders 
from the private sector together to formulate public policy" [Okimoto (1989), 
p.152]. The personal relations existing between retired and present civil 
servants, embodied in the system of amakudari. facilitate the process of 
consensus building between public and private sectors: consensus that is a 
necessary condition for government policies to be effective in the societal or 
network state. In this approach, amakudari is instrumental especially in the 
process of policymaking: the continuous informal consultations and negotiations 
generate consensus regarding government policies, which are then relatively easy 
to implement. Upham (1987) stresses also the importance of amakudari as a mecha-
nism for reaching consensus between public and private sectors. In his view, 
this contact between public and private sectors and elites "... is furthered by 
an informal, consultative policymaking process that encourages the formation of 
personal relationships across institutional boundaries. What cements the 
relationship is a congruence of interests among public and private elites. When 
Japanese bureaucrats retire, most take positions in the private sector, many in 
the very firms they have been dealing with during their bureaucratie career - a 
process known as amakudari. or "descending from heaven" " [Upham (1987), p.167]. 
In the consensual policy interpretation, amakudari is not used to implement 
administrative guidance or to equalize relative corporate power imbalances, but 
to formulate government policies in a continuous public-private sector interac-
tive process. Okimoto (1987), p.164-165, emphasizes that the importance of 
amakudari from the perspective of government control over private business 
should not be overstated. The ex-bureaucrat will quite likely in his new 
business environment be regarded suspiciously as an outsider, favoured above the 
regular staff for a leading executive position, contrary to the tendency of 
Japanese companies to recruit executives intemally. Or even worse, the retired 
bureaucrat could be suspected of being an instrument of government control, an 
possible executor of administrative guidance. Consequently, he has to operate 
carefully, and has to show his dedication and loyalty to the company to obtain 
the confidence of his new colleagues. The governmental organizations which send 
their retirees into amakudari positions face constraints as well: if they would 
try to exercise substantial and excessive control through their former staff-
explicitly to the implementation of administrative guidance, a link which 
is ignored by Okimoto and Upham. Consequently, Johnson and Schaede are 
classified as belonging to the government control school. 
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members, they would likely endanger future amakudari positions in these respec-
tive companies. These behavioural constraints seem according to Okimoto (1989) 
to limit the extent or possibility to which the former bureaucrat is used as an 
executive body of strong administrative guidance by his former employer. As 
Okimoto puts it, regarding the policies of MITI: "... elitist or conspiratorial 
interpretations of amakudari [italics added-AvR] - as MITI's Trojan horse -
should be taken with more than a grain of salt. One should not exaggerate the 
scope of the influence gained by MITI through the system of amakudari [italics 
added-AvR]. More than expanding MITI's own power, the system works to consolida-
te the structure of government-business ties and the interpenetration of the 
public and private sectors"103 
After this discussion of amakudari. attention will be paid to the personal 
network based on common university backgrounds, i.e. gakubatsu. 
Okimoto (1989), p.165. 
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3.4.2 Gakubatsu 
According to Nakane (1970), p.117, the existence of university cliques or 
gakubatsu is in Japan "... so well developed that they may indeed sometimes have 
a function comparable to that of a caste group in India, in terms of a monopoly 
of certain privileges through mobilizing, in a helpful fashion, friendships and 
relationships that are able to cut across departmental and institutional 
divisions". The significance of these university cliques is based on a strong 
sense of group consciousness, resulting from sharing the experiences and status 
of the same university. This strong consciousness of one's academie background 
establishes a mutual support system within as well as between Japanese organiza-
tions. The importance of gakubatsu is a direct consequence of the structure of 
the university system. The Japanese education system is highly competitive, the 
ultlmate goal being a position at one of the most prestigious universi-
ties-'-"^ . The prestige of the university attended is so important because it 
is decisive for one's future career: as will be explained below, the most 
prestigious government organizations and private companies recruit from an 
extremely small number of universities. In other words, if you pass the entrance 
examination of one of these universities, you have guaranteed a successful 
future. The importance of university prestige is put aptly by Wiersema and Bird 
(1993), p.1007: It "... is a strong indicator of social class in Japanese 
society ... and among managers", and "... is likely to influence not only the 
organization joined but also the career trajectory within the organization". The 
consciousness of prestige develops strong bonds between graduates from the same 
universities, and has a significant influence on relationships not only between 
individuals inside and outside organizations, but also between organizations: 
the "... hierarchical ranking of Japanese universities in terms of prestige 
influences interfirm and intrafirm relations, schaping patterns of association, 
affiliation, and group formation"^5. 
The most famous gakubatsu are based on the University of Tokyo, which is 
considered the top university of Japan, and four other prestigious universities, 
of which two public (Kyoto and Hitotsübashi) and two private (Keio and Waseda), 
together called the "Big Five". Generally, common university backgrounds are 
LW
 Rohlen (1988), p.28, and Rohlen (1992), p.334. For more informati-
on on the Japanese university system the reader is referred to these 
studies. 
iu:5
 Clark (1979), as quoted from Wiersema and Bird (1993), p.1007. For 
more elaborate discussion see Nakane (1970), p.133-135. 
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said to be important from two perspectives^°. 
First, from the perspective of the individual company and its internal organiza-
tion, it should be noted that a significant number of large Japanese organiza-
tions limit their recruitment of new college graduates to specific universi-
tiesl"'. If one really wants to make it in these organizations, one has to 
graduate from one of those universities. The reasons for this specific orienta-
tion of recruitment seem to be firstly to use the prestige consciousness to 
build a coherent and homogeneous organization, and secondly the f act that the 
best students are located in the small number of most prestigious universities 
at the top of the university system. The graduates of these specific universi-
ties are of course much sought af ter by any organization in Japan. The most 
famous example of the orientation on specific universities when recruiting new 
university graduates is given by the recruitment practice of the Japanese 
government bureaucracy. A large number of the career government bureaucrats in 
Japan has graduated from the University of Tokyo fToodail , with the graduates 
from its Faculty of Law in particular moving into the most prestigious positions 
in the top-ranking ministries. A 1965-study of the National Personnel Authority 
found that 73 percent of investigated government bureaucrats at department chief 
level of above graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo 
[Johnson (1982), p.60]. Looking at the results of the examinations which serve 
as the basis for all significant bureaucratie recruitment, Pempel and Muramatsu 
(1993), p.21, note that "... although there has been some reduction in the 
dominance of the civil service by University of Tokyo graduates, roughly 35-40 
per cent of the successful applicants continue to be Tokyo graduates"108 
i U Ö
 Based on Nakane (1970), Johnson (1974), Haitani (1976), Johnson 
(1982), Taira and Wada (1987), Hollerman (1988), Calder (1989), Okimoto 
(1989), van Wolferen (1991), Wiersema and Bird (1993), Schaede (1994), 
Snider and Bird (1994) and Ursacki (1994). Supported by numerous personal 
interviews with among others Western Japanologist, August 1990; Western 
journalists, June 1992; Japanese legal scholars, September-November 1992; 
Western economie scholar, September 1992; former senior manager Keidanren, 
January 1993; staffmembers Ministry of Finance, January and February 1993; 
staffmembers Bank of Japan, August-December 1992, and January-June 1993; 
Japanese bankers, April, May and June 1993, Tokyo. Personal correspondence 
with number of Western and Japanese economists, political scientists and 
sociologists. 
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 Wiersema and Bird (1993), p.1007. See also Nakane (1970), p.104. 
•"•0° When looking only at the Class I examinations, which select the 
likely future candidates for the top positions, University of Tookyo 
graduates comprised in 1991 just over 50 percent of successful applicants, 
with Waseda and Kyooto Universities placed second and third (11.8 and 7 
percent respectively) [Pempel and Muramatsu (1993), p.21-22]. They also 
conclude that "usually only 15 or so of Japan's 460-odd universities see 10 
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Other (semi) public organizations heavily dominated by Toodal graduates are for 
example the Japan Development Bank, the Japan Export-Import Bank and Bank of 
Japan with 80.0%, 87.5% and even 92.9% of their directors being graduates from 
the University of Tokyol09 The limitation of recruitment to specific univer-
sities when hiring new high-level staffmembers is also present among private 
sector companies. Wiersema and Bird (1993), p.1007, discuss the example of 
Mitsukoshi, a large retail company; about 60 percent of its college graduates 
are from two private universities, i.e. Keioo and Waseda. Another example is S&B 
Foods, 88.2% of whose directors are from Waseda University^- . 
Second, common university backgrounds are important in the sense that they 
establish informal networks for exchanging information, consultation and coordi-
nation of policies between various organizations and segments of society. This 
aspect of gakubatsu receives the most attention in Japanese economie studies, in 
particular in the interventionist, consensual policy and "Japan, Inc." 
schools^-. 
First, C. Johnson, one of the main representatives of the interventionist 
school, concludes that gakubatsu "... forms the most pervasive "old boy" network 
throughout the society as a whole" [Johnson (1982), p.57]. Johnson focuses 
explicitly on the university clique based on the University of Tokyo [Toodai], 
i.e. the Toodaibatsu. The main reason for him to do so lies in the f act that 
Toodai graduates are positioned in the highest levels of public and private 
sectors, establishing a network of managerial and bureaucratie elites predicated 
on graduation from the University of Tokyo. The existence of the Toodai network 
facilitates the communication between government and private business. And in 
Johnson's view, perhaps more important, "... the Toodai [italics added-AvR] 
connection means that both government offices and board rooms are staffed by men 
who share a common outlook", based on the specific education at the University 
of Tookyo, which results in a "... homogenization of views" [Johnson (1982), 
p.60-62]. This congruence of public and private views makes it easier to 
or more of their graduates succeed in the exams". 
1 0 9
 Toyo Keizai Shinposha (1992), p.1623. Idea to look at this 
specific page in this püblication borrowed from Ursacki (1994), p.638. 
Ü 0 ursacki (1994), p.638. For more examples of private and public 
companies characterized by a specific university background of their 
executives see Toyo Keizai Shinposha (1992), p.1623. 
1 H The pluralistic network school stresses the importance of inclusi-
ve informal networks in the Japanese political economy, without explicitly 
naming these networks. 
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formulate and implement government economie policies, directed by the bureaucra-
tie staf f of the developmental statel". In this sense, Toodaibatsu is in-
strumental in the process of economie policy, and contributes to the effective-
ness of administrative guidanceH-*. 
Second, the consensual policy school sees gakubatsu as one of the informal 
policy networks, which are used to bring public and private sectors together to 
formulate economie policies. This opinion has been put forward especially in 
Okimoto (1989), where also the importance of the Toodaibatsu is emphasized, and 
Boyd (1987) and üpham (1987)114. 
Finally, the "Japan, Inc." interpretation of the Japanese political economy, 
i.e. the Japanese version of the power elite model, sees the Toodaibatsu as a 
powerful elite which runs the Japanese economy. A clear example of this inter-
pretation is the study by Taira and Wada, which concludes that the economie 
system is manipulated and led by the "Toodai-government-business (TGB) complex": 
the Japanese economy is not guided by the market mechanism, but by the "Invisi-
ble Hand" of the TGB-complex, "... a remarkahle system of national economie 
management" [Taira and Wada (1987), p.267]115. 
To illustrate the importance of graduating from specific universities, figure 
3.3 shows the university backgrounds ("Big Five") of the top-executives of the 
around 2,000 companies listed on the major three stock exchanges, plus major 
non-listed insurance companies and business organizations. 
112 u. Schaede, a clear adherent of the interventionist school, has a 
more nuanced view: in Schaede (1994), p.15, it is stated that "While one 
should not generalize and exaggerate the relevance of the university 
relation, in individual cases it can be very important". 
113 perSonal interview, Western scholar, August 1990; Japanese banker 
(chairman), December 1993, Tokyo. 
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 Okimoto (1989), p.156, Boyd (1987), p.67, and Upham (1987), p.167. 
H-' An interesting example of the power elite model is presented in 
Hollerman (1988), p.112, where it is stated that there are two elites, a 
premier elite, i.e. graduates from Toodai Law Faculty, and a secondary 
elite formed by graduates of Keioo University. The Keioobatsu dominated the 
textile industry, and has become more influential in the Keidanren. the 
powerful business federation that is arguing for administrative reform and 
less government interference with the economy. The Keioobatsu is conse-
quently indirectly attacking the Toodaibatsu in a struggle for a more 
liberalised economie system. 
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Figure 3.3 University background of Japanese company executives, 
1983-1993 (directors and above) 
("Big Five" universities) 
1983 
No. % 
1988 
No. % 
1992 
No. % 
1993 
No. % 
Tokyo 
Kyoto 
Hitotsübashi 
Keio 
Waseda 
4849 15.7 
2187 7.1 
977 3.2 
1767 5.7 
1684 5.5 
4805 13.7 
2226 6.4 
1148 3.3 
2320 6.6 
2462 7.0 
4444 10.8 
2178 5.3 
1136 2.8 
2940 7.2 
3019 7.4 
4178 10.2 
2064 5.1 
1089 2.7 
3037 7.4 
2961 7.3 
Total% Big 5 37.1 37.1 34.2 32.7 
Source: Ursacki (1994), p.646116. 
The numbers show clearly the predominance of "Big Five" graduates in the Board 
of Directors of the leading Japanese companies: the graduates of 5 universities, 
out of a total of about 500 universities and colleges in Japan, have occupied in 
recent years around one third of the top executive positions. It is interesting 
to see that the share of the top three public universities (Tokyo, Kyoto and 
Hitotsübashi) over the last 10 years has decreased from 26% in 1983 to 18% in 
1993, while the share of the private universities (Keio and Waseda) has increa-
sed from 11.2% to 14.7%. However, to grasp the real significance of the figures 
presented, one has to take into account the total number of graduates from the 
respective "Big Five" universities. For example, the number of graduates from 
the individual public universities is much smaller than from Keio and Wase-
daH7. xhis factor strenghtens the importance of graduating from one of the 
top three public universities. 
3.4.3 Summary and Overview 
In this chapter, various aspects of the government-business relationship have 
been discussed from an informal perspective. As has been discussed in section 
3.1, informality applied to studies of the Japanese economie system involves 
•
L-Lb
 % is percentage of total number of company executives, as publis-
hed in Yakuin Shiki Ho [Toyo Keizai Shinposha]. 
Ü 7 in 1992 the number of graduates from these universities were (in 
brackets): University of Tokyo (1662), Kyoto University (1755), Hitotsübas-
hi University (948), Keio University (4183) and Waseda University (6116). 
Source is the Sunday Mainichi (1992), p.147. Furthermore, Hitotsübashi Uni-
versity is by far the smallest of the three public universities. Therefore, 
a final conclusion can only be drawn after calculating weighted numbers 
which take into account the respective total number of graduates from these 
universities. 
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commonly and predominantly the study of two issues: administrative guidance and 
informal networks, in particular amakudari and gakubatsu. As such, informality 
has two dimensions. 
First, it is interpreted from a legal perspective: informal government inter-
vention in the economie system, in the sense of implementation of economie 
policies which can not be enforced by legal means. 
Second, informality means the existence of non-transparent networks, which con-
nect public and private spheres. These networks are based on personal relation-
ships resulting from common backgrounds, and are used in either the formulation 
or implementation of economie policies. 
In figure 3.4, an overview of the various interpretations of informal aspects of 
economie policy in Japan is presented. 
Figure 3.4 Classification of Informal Aspects of Japanese 
Economie Policy 
Legal Non-legal 
Transparent Tsuutatsu 
(public administrative guidance) 
Non-transparent Informal networks: Gakubatsu 
Amakudari 
Private administrative guidance 
Furthermore, attention has been paid to the specific interpretation of informa-
lity in the various schools of the Japanese economie system which were discussed 
in the previous chapter. The views of the interventionist, market, consensual 
policy and pluralistic network schools of informal aspects in Japanese economie 
policy are summarised in figure 3.5. The "Japan, Inc." interpretation has been 
included as well, given its attention for gakubatsu. 
Figure 3.5 shows clearly the differences in orientation between the schools 
discussed. The interventionist school emphasizes the importance of informal 
mechanisms for the implementation of economie policy. In its perception, 
administrative guidance is one of the most important policy instruments, and 
informal networks, in particular amakudari. are used to influence business 
decisions. In other words, the interventionists see informality with respect to 
government-business relations as a direct control mechanism of the government 
economie bureaucracy. 
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Against this orientation are the views of the consensual policy and pluralistic 
network schools which stress especially the significance of informality in the 
formulation of economie policy. Administrative guidance is not important 
anymore, but informal networks like amakudari and gakubatsu are important 
channels for coordination and negotiation between public and private sectors. 
Furthermore, the market school, which does not believe that the Japanese 
government contributed significantly to the "Japanese miracle" anyway, regards 
the importance of informal factors as control mechanism or as any other advanta-
ge for the government in its formulation and implementation of economie policy 
as negligible. Finally, the "Japan, Inc." school, which according to numerous 
authors is no longer relevant for the contemporary Japanese economie system, 
sees the economy managed by the political, bureaucratie and business elites, in 
other words mainly by the Toodaibatsu. 
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Figure 3.5 Informality applied to Economie Policy as interpreted in Schools of Japanese E 
School of Economie System Administrative Guidance Informal networks 
1) Interventionist School In the bureaucracy-led state, 
administrative guidance is one of 
the most important Instruments to 
implement economie policy and to 
control the economie system. It 
can unilaterally be enforced by 
the government bureauercy. 
In the bureaucracy-
system of amakudari 
bureaucracy with an 
channel to implemen 
tive guidance: gaku 
mental in the formu 
plementation of eco 
2) Market School In the pluralistic society, the 
government bureaucracy is not 
powerful enough to control the 
economie system. The market me-
chanism is the dominating force, 
administrative guidance is not 
effective. 
Amakudari is not an 
economie policy, bu 
promote the interes 
vate sector and to 
tive business posit 
attention for gakub 
3) Consensual Policy/Network 
State School 
In the network state, the reach-
ing of consensus between public 
and private sectors is a prere-
quisite for administrative gui-
dance to be effective. Generally, 
administrative guidance is not 
important anymore. 
In the network stat 
bureaucracy is rela 
and can operate onl 
sus is reached. ama 
gakubatsu are infor 
works, instrumental 
consensus and formu 
4) Pluralistic Network Model Administrative guidance was an 
important and effective instru-
ment, but lost much of its appeal 
and effectiveness 
Amakudari and gakub 
explicitly referred 
this school stresse 
tance of informal n 
sources of coordina 
flows. 
5) "Japan, Inc." Administrative guidance is not 
relevant 
Gakubatsu important 
"runs" the Japanese 
46 
3.5 Conclusions 
The analysis of informality with respect to the Japanese economie systent can be 
reduced to two main issues. 
First, in some part of the literature the proposition has been put forward that 
the economie process in Japan is not only organized by the market mechanism, but 
that informal networks behind the market have been established, which function 
as additional coordination mechanisms. From this perspective, studies emphasize 
the existence of informal business groups and personal networks, examples being 
the central position of the Keiretsu in Gerlach (1992) and Imai (1992), and the 
theory of social exchange in Murakami and Rohlen (1992). This emphasis has 
resulted in the view that the Japanese economie system is a specific variant of 
Western market capitalism, giving rise to interpretations such as alliance 
capitalism or consultative capitalism1^. 
Second, and particularly relevant for this study, a number of schools stress the 
importance of informal factors in the public-private sector economie relation-
ship: in other words, in the intervention of the govemment in the economie 
system, i.e. economie policy. When following the paradigm of the bureaucracy-led 
state of the interventionist school, this means the use of informal instruments 
to implement policies. On the other hand, when following the concept of the 
network state of the consensual policy school, it means the use of informal net-
works to reach consensus and formulate policies. 
This conclusion once again shows how important it is to define clearly the 
conceptual framework and basic assumptions which form the starting point of 
economie analysis: different assumptions regarding the specific relationship 
between Japanese govemment bureaucracy and private sector generate different 
conclusions regarding the specific function of informal mechanisms in Japanese 
economie policy. 
Furthermore, this chapter also showed again the fundamental differences between 
the various schools of the Japanese economie system. More specific, regarding 
the relevance of informal factors in Japanese economie policy, the interventio-
nist and network schools criticize the market school and consequently to a 
certain extent also economics as a science for ignoring these factors. In fact, 
the issue of informality seems to lie at the heart of the controversy between 
these schools. It has to be mentioned that there are important differences in 
the opinions of those who support the view that informality is an essential 
ll
° Alliance capitalism from Gerlach (1992); Consultative capitalism 
from Schaede (1994). 
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characteristic of the Japanese economie system. For example, Van Wolferen, one 
of the so-called revisionists, sees everything in not only the economy but the 
whole "Japanese System" explained by inforaal relations: this "... System is 
what it is by virtue of inforaal relations that have no basis in the constituti-
on, in any other laws or in any f oraal rules of the ministries, the LDP, the 
corporations or any other of the administrator institutions''^9. Other inter-
pretations, for example the consensual policy and pluralistic network schools, 
have a much more nuanced view. 
Given the alleged importance of informal factors for Japanese economie policy in 
the interventionist and network schools, and given their criticism of mainstream 
economie explanantions and interpretations of the Japanese economie system, this 
study takes up the gauntlet and includes explicitly informal factors in the 
analysis of Japanese monetary policy. Therefore, in the following chapters, the 
relevance of the specific interpretations of informality in these schools for 
monetary policy will be investigated. This investigation will establish the 
framework for consequent analysis of informality in Japanese monetary policy. 
It has to be said that most studies on the relevance of informal factors in the 
public-private sector economie relationship do not take into account monetary 
policy specifically. However, their results are also relevant for the analysis 
of monetary policy for two reasons. 
First, studies which emphasize informal factors take predominantly a general 
view: informality is said to be a fundamental characteristic of Japanese 
economie policy and government control^O Consequently, informal factors are 
also relevant for monetary policy, being one of the major parts of government 
intervention in the economie system. 
Second, the informal mechanisms discussed in this chapter are present in 
Japanese monetary policy and financial system. Reportedly, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of Japan use administrative guidance in the implementation 
of their policies. Furthermore, the informal networks constituted by amakudari 
and gakubatsu have been developed in the financial system as well. 
Therefore, in the following chapters the link between political economy, 
economie system and monetary policy, following the concept of informality, will 
be investigated. 
1 1 9
 Van Wolferen (1989), p.109. 
1 2 0
 See for example Johnson (1978), p.22-23, and Home (1988a), p.146-
159. 
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